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LEGAL TRANSPLANTS AND ADAPTATION IN A COLONIAL
SETTING: COMPANY LAW IN BRITISH MALAYA
Petra Mahy∗ and Ian Ramsay∗∗
This paper traces the development of company law during the colonial era in British Malaya, pro-
viding details on the laws of the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States. It also presents
an account of economic development and the use of the limited liability company form in these two
interlinked jurisdictions. The paper notes the lack of connection between the evolution of company
law in Malaya, local economic and political developments and the actual local use of the law. We
situate this material within three current debates about the nature of colonial company law: whether
the law was more a product of the “transplant effect” than of legal family; whether the dispersal of
company law to the colonies was as straightforward as is often assumed; and whether the law was
best characterised as “imperialism”.
I. Introduction
[E]ven when a colony’s ordinance has reproduced an English Act, say the Com-
panies Act 1862 or 1929, it may well be that the draftsman of the colonial code
has not made a careful study of the background to the English Act and its raison
d’être as a prelude to his task. If and when he has thought fit to make changes to
certain provisions of the English Act, by what objective criteria of relevancy or
legitimacy may he have arrived at his conclusions vis-à-vis the local people and
circumstances? Since neither he nor the legislators of most colonies would have
carried out any comprehensive research into the particular piece of commercial
legislation, it must be by extreme good fortune that the resulting local enactment
would be just what would suit the situation.1
An increasing interest in understanding the colonial sources and development of
company law has emerged out of recent theoretical debates about the existence of
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1 T. Olawale Elias, British Colonial Law: A Comparative Study of the Interaction Between English and
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strong path dependency links between present day company laws and their historical
antecedents. First, the influential “legal origins” theory regards the introduction
of company law, and the legal family from which it came, as having long-term
influence on the strength of protections afforded to shareholders.2 According to this
theory, countries belonging to the “common law” family have stronger shareholder
protections than “civil law” countries. Stronger shareholder protections are thought
to enhance market capitalisation and hence, it is argued, the historical legacies of
“common law” are more beneficial for present day economic development. Among
a number of critical responses to the “legal origins” theory is the work of Pistor et al.3
They argued that “good” company law is that which develops incrementally over
time in response to local political and economic change, that is, it is highly adaptable,
rather than necessarily having the strongest shareholder protections. In their view,
legal adaptability is affected by local demand for law and the responsiveness of legal
drafters to that demand, as well as by whether company law provides mandatory rules
or rather enables users to tailor rules to their own needs. In their comparative study
of ten jurisdictions, Pistor et al. found that company law in common law “origin”
countries has tended to be more adaptable than in civil law “origin” jurisdictions.
However, they found that in “transplant” countries the law developed very differently
to that of its relevant parent legal family. Pistor et al. demonstrated that transplanted
law is unlikely to correspond to local demand and thus often displays patterns of
erratic change or long periods of stagnation rather than incremental co-evolution
with economic and social developments. Overall, that study, together with other
related work,4 argues that this “transplant effect”, and the way that law was received,
is much more important than the legal family in determining outcomes of the law in
“transplant” countries.
A second debate involving the colonial origins of company law concerns the
implicit assumption made in the “legal origins” literature that there was just one
straightforward original transplant of company legislation. As Pargendler has persua-
sively argued, the legal origins theorists based their model on the fact that company
law was transplanted to the colonies, but incorrectly assumed that the laws had
been directly transposed by the coloniser without any local political involvement
or adaptation.5 Pargendler’s research on Brazil and Mahy’s study of the Nether-
lands Indies (Indonesia) have demonstrated that company law development there
was characterised by diverse origins, selective transplants and at least some local
adaptation.6 In the case of the British Empire, McQueen observed that there have
been few detailed studies of how the English model of company law was dispersed
2 Rafael La Porta et al., “Legal Determinants of External Finance” (1997) 52 The Journal of Finance
1131; Rafael La Porta et al., “Law and Finance” (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113 [La
Porta et al., “Law and Finance”].
3 Katharina Pistor et al., “The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison” (2002) 23
U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 791 [Pistor et al., “The Evolution of Corporate Law”]. See also Katharina Pistor
et al., “Innovation in Corporate Law” (2003) 31 Journal of Comparative Economics 676.
4 Daniel Berkowitz et al., “The Transplant Effect” (2003) 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 163.
5 La Porta et al., “Law and Finance”, supra note 2, as critiqued in Mariana Pargendler, “Politics in the
Origins: The Making of Corporate Law in Nineteenth-Century Brazil” (2012) 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 805.
6 Pargendler, ibid.; Petra Mahy, “The Evolution of Company Law in Indonesia: An Exploration of Legal
Innovation and Stagnation” (2013) 61 Am. J. Comp. L. 377.
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via colonisation because of assumptions about its uniformity and universality.7
McQueen demonstrated that in fact many differences can be seen on closer exam-
ination of particular country cases.8 It is true that British colonies tended to make
blanket adoptions of English common law and equity principles at some point in
their histories, and the Board of Trade and the Colonial Office generally promoted
legal uniformity of commercial laws between Britain and its colonies.9 The colonies,
however, often took quite different approaches to recognising existing local law, to
adapting English law to the colonial context and to creating new original laws.10
A third line of debate questions whether the introduction and effects of company
law in the colonial context is best understood as “imperialism”. This debate, too,
is concerned with innovation and the adaptability of the law to local conditions.
McQueen’s argument for characterising company law as an instrument of imperial-
ism holds that colonial powers used company legislation to further the commercial
interests of the metropolis and made little or no attempt to adapt the law for use
by the local population. Hence the law served to impede rather than to foster local
economic development.11 Similar claims emerge from discussion of the ongoing
repercussions of the company law transplant in the post-independence era in Asia.
The current state of corporate governance is blamed by some on the original colonial
transplant, its inherent imperialism and the lack of adaptability to local conditions
and business cultures.12 This argument is supported by evidence of the mismatch
between Asian family business practices and the particular agency problems that
Western company law is designed to regulate.13
7 Rob McQueen, A Social History of Company Law: Great Britain and the Australian Colonies 1854-1920
(Surrey:Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2009) at 14 [McQueen, A Social History of Company Law]. Other stud-
ies of company law in British colonies include: Phillip Lipton, “A History of Company Law in Colonial
Australia: Economic Development and Legal Evolution” (2007) 31 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 805; Radhe
Shyam Rungta, The Rise of Business Corporations in India, 1851-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970); R.C.B. Risk, “The Nineteenth Century Foundations of the Business Cor-
poration in Ontario” (1973) 23 U.T.L.J. 270; Ron Harris & Michael Crystal, “Some Reflections on the
Transplantation of British Company Law in Post-Ottoman Palestine” (2009) 10 Theor. Inq. L. 561.
8 Rob McQueen, “The Flowers of Progress: Corporations Law in the Colonies” (2009) 17 Griffith
L.R. 383.
9 Great Britain, Board of Trade, Comparative Analysis of the Company Laws of the United Kingdom, India,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa with a Memorandum Prepared for the Imperial
Conference 1907 by the Director of the Board of Trade (London: Darling & Son, Ltd., 1907) (Cd
3589); L.C.B. Gower, “Company Law Reform” (1962) 4 Mal. L. Rev. 36; Harris & Crystal, supra
note 7.
10 Ronald J. Daniels et al., “The Legacy of Empire: The Common Law Inheritance and Commitments
to Legality in Former British Colonies” (2011) 59 Am. J. Comp. L. 111; Matthew K. Lange, “British
Colonial Legacies and Political Development” (2004) 32 World Development 905.
11 Rob McQueen, “Company Law as Imperialism” (1995) 5 Austl. J. Corp. L. 187; McQueen, A Social
History of Company Law, supra note 7; Cf. Lipton, supra note 7.
12 Mohammad Rizal Salim, “Legal Transplantation and Local Knowledge: Corporate Governance in
Malaysia” (2006) 20 Austl. J. Corp. L. 55; Aishah Bidin, “Law Reform and Corporate Governance
in Malaysia” in John Gillespie & Randall Peerenboom, eds., Regulation in Asia: Pushing Back on
Globalization (Hoboken: Routledge, 2009) 296.
13 See e.g., Benny Tabalujan, “Family Capitalism and Corporate Governance of Family Controlled Listed
Companies in Indonesia” (2002) 25 U.N.S.W.L.J. 486; Andrew Rosser, “Coalitions, Convergence and
Corporate Governance Reforms in Indonesia” (2003) 24 Third World Quarterly 319; Jomo K.S., “Cor-
porate Governance Reform for East Asia” in Jomo Kwame Sundaram & Wong Sau Ngan, eds., Law,
Institutions and Malaysian Economic Development (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008) 222.
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While company law developments in contemporary Malaysia and Singapore have
been much discussed,14 there has been no close examination conducted of the laws’
original development in colonial Malaya.15 Further, most texts on company law in
Malaysia and Singapore tend to merely note in passing the indisputably English (and
Australian) origins of the law and quickly move on.16 This paper fills this gap in the
existing research by presenting a descriptive account of the development of com-
pany law in British Malaya,17 focusing on the Straits Settlements and the Federated
Malay States. The paper then describes the actual use of the law by the different racial
groups who were present in Malaya, and particularly highlights the vast difference
in the numbers of London-based companies and locally incorporated companies that
participated in Malaya’s tin and rubber booms. The paper concludes by analysing
this material in relation to the three interrelated debates outlined above: whether
colonial company law development in Malaya was more a product of the “trans-
plant effect” than of legal family; whether the assumption that the dispersal of
company legislation to the colonies was straightforward and uniform is true in rela-
tion to Malaya; and whether colonial company law in Malaya is best understood as
“imperialism”.
II. The Spread of British Colonial Power in Malaya
During the British colonial era in Malaya, there were a number of different admin-
istrative regimes resulting from the piecemeal extension of British power over the
region by means of various treaties. The Straits Settlements, consisting primarily of
Singapore, Penang and Malacca, were established under the control of the British
East India Company in 1826 and later became a separate Crown Colony in 1867
with its own Governor and Legislative Council. The Legislative Council comprised
a handful of government high office holders or “Official”18 representatives as well
14 See e.g., Janine Pascoe & Shanthy Rachagan, “Key Developments in Corporate Law Reform in
Malaysia” [2005] Sing. J.L.S. 93; Janine Pascoe, “Corporate Law Reform and Some ‘Rule of Law’
Issues in Malaysia” (2008) 38 Hong Kong L.J. 769; Walter Woon, “Reforming Company Law in Singa-
pore” (2011) 23 Sing.Ac. L. J. 795; Vivien Chen, “The Evolution of Malaysian Shareholder Protection:A
Legal Origins Analysis” [2013] Sing. J.L.S. 100.
15 Note that Pistor et al., “The Evolution of Corporate Law”, supra note 3 at 847, included Malaysia in
their comparative study, but provided very little detail regarding the colonial period.
16 See e.g., Shanthy Rachagan et al., Concise Principles of Company Law in Malaysia, 3rd ed. (Petaling
Jaya: LexisNexis, 2010) at 3-5; Victor Yeo et al., Commercial Applications of Company Law in Singa-
pore, 4th ed. (Singapore: CCH Asia, 2011) at 22; Aiman Nariman Mohd Sulaiman et al., Commercial
Applications of Company Law in Malaysia, 3rd ed. (Singapore: CCH Asia, 2008) at 29, 30.
17 The term “British Malaya” or “Malaya” is used in this paper to refer collectively to the Straits Settlements,
Federated Malay States and the Unfederated Malay States.
18 According to scholars of the politics and economy of British Malaya, the Officials usually served the
objectives of the metropolis but often also had business interests and ideologies of their own. They
were not necessarily the tools of British business but the policies that they pursued, including free
trade in Singapore, the opening-up of the Malay States and infrastructure development, provided the
ideal conditions for British business to flourish. See A.J. Stockwell, “The White Man’s Burden and
Brown Humanity: Colonialism and Ethnicity in British Malaya” (1982) 10 Southeast Asian Journal of
Social Science 44 at 52; Jean-Jacques van Helten & Geoffrey Jones, “British Business in Malaysia and
Singapore since the 1870s” in R.P.T. Davenport-Hines & Geoffrey Jones, eds., British Business in Asia
Since 1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) c. 6 at 188.
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as “Unofficial”19 non-government members, usually including one Chinese repre-
sentative. In 1924, a new Legislative Council was established consisting of thirteen
Official and thirteen Unofficial members all appointed by the Governor. The Straits
Settlements, particularly Singapore, were originally a free-trade entrepôt centre for
South and Southeast Asia and South China, and the entry harbour through which
Western manufactured goods and opium were traded in the region. Singapore had
a very small population of Malay and Chinese when the British first arrived. The
new settlement quickly attracted large numbers of Chinese migrants, and the Chinese
population continued to grow throughout the colonial period. By 1931, the Chinese
represented 75.1 per cent of the population of Singapore, while Malays were 11.7
per cent, Indians 9.1 per cent and “Others” (including the British) were the small
remainder.20
The British “forward movement” into the Malay Peninsula began in 1874 with
the Treaty of Pangkor under which the Sultan of Perak accepted a British Resident,
who formally acted as an advisor to the Sultan but whose advice in almost all matters
was bound to be followed. Other Malay states later also accepted Residents, and
then in 1895, four of the states—Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak and Selangor—
were amalgamated into the Federated Malay States. Although the Federated Malay
States were never formally designated as a colony, and the fiction of Malay rule
was maintained, the territory was firmly under the control of the British. A Federal
Council was established for the Federated Malay States in 1909 consisting of the
Malay hereditary ruler of each of the four states, the British Residents of each state
and some other Official and Unofficial members, again usually including one or two
Chinese representatives. The Federated Malay States formed the hinterland regions
while the Straits Settlements was the business hub of the area, although the tin and
rubber booms in the Federated Malay States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries were to change that to some extent. In the Federated Malay States in 1911,
the racial composition of the population was 10 per cent Indian, 54 per cent Malay
and 34 per cent Chinese. By 1947, the Chinese proportion of the population had
increased to 45 per cent, the Malay population had decreased to 43 percent and the
Indian population had remained constant at 10 per cent. The balance of the population
consisted of smaller minorities.21
The remaining Unfederated States on the Malay Peninsula—Johor, Kedah, Kelan-
tan, Perlis and Terengganu—nominally retained their independence but eventually
all accepted British Residents. Following World War II, the Malayan Union was
formed in 1946 amalgamating the Straits Settlements, Federated Malay States and
the Unfederated States, apart from Singapore which was given status as a separate
Crown Colony. The Malayan Union was remodelled as the Federation of Malaya
in 1948. Independence from Britain was achieved in 1957, and the Federation of
Malaysia was formed in 1963 encompassing Singapore, and the states of Sarawak
and Sabah in Borneo. Singapore was forced to secede from Malaysia in 1965.
19 The Unofficial members of the Straits Settlements Legislative Council often represented Chambers of
Commerce or other business interests and acted as the watch-dogs for the welfare of plantation, mining
and trading enterprises. See Stockwell, ibid. at 52.
20 Saw Swee-Hock, “Population Trends in Singapore 1819-1967” (1969) 10 Journal of Southeast Asian
History 36 at 41.
21 Amarjit Kaur, “Indian Labour, Labour Standards, and Workers’ Health in Burma and Malaya, 1900-
1940” (2006) 40 Modern Asian Studies 425 at 432.
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III. The Development of Company Law in British Malaya
In colonial Malaya, the Straits Settlements was the leader in company law develop-
ment, with the Federated Malay States tending to follow the Straits Settlements’
lead.22 It was the Straits Settlements Companies Ordinance which was carried
forward into the Malayan Union and then through into independent Malaysia and
Table 1.
Chronology of Company Law Developments in the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay
States Indicating the General Influence of Legislation in England and India.
England India Straits Settlements Federated
Malay States
Joint Stock Companies
Act, 1844
Companies Act, 1850 — —
Limited Liability Act,
1855
Joint Stock Companies
Act, 1856
Companies Act, 1857
Companies Act, 1860
— —
Companies Act, 1862 Companies Act, 1866 Indian Companies
Act, 1866
Civil Law
Ordinance IV, 1878
—
Various amendments
including:
Companies
(Amendment) Act,
1867
Joint Stock Companies
Arrangement Act, 1870
[Companies
(Amendment) Act,
1879—not followed in
Straits Settlements]
[Further developments
in India are not
included here as they
were not directly
relevant to the Straits
Settlements and
Federated Malay
States.]
Companies
Ordinance, 1889
Identical
Enactments in
each state within
the Federated
Malay States,
1897
Amendments to
each Federated
Malay States
Enactment,
1903
22 Three of the Unfederated States—Johor, Kedah and Kelantan—passed almost identical companies
ordinances, but these were only to facilitate the registration of foreign companies and to permit them
to hold land, and did not establish independent incorporation procedures (Johor Foreign Companies
Enactment No. 5 of 1926; Kedah Enactment No. 41 (Foreign Companies) No. 7 of 1347 (approx. 1928),
No. 9 of 1349 (approx. 1930), No. 13 of 1350 (approx. 1931); Kelantan Enactment No. 14 of 1931). In
North Borneo (Sabah), the development of company law was oriented to India. It adopted the Indian
Companies Acts of 1882 and 1887 (See C.F.C. Macaskie, “The Law and Legislation of the State of
North Borneo” (1921) 3 Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 200 at 203, 210).
Later, the Procedure Ordinance, 1926 (No. 1) adopted a number of major Indian Acts to North Borneo
including the Indian Companies Act, 1913. After North Borneo became a British Crown Colony, the
Companies Ordinance, 1950 (No. 18) adopted the Companies Ordinance 1940 (S.S.) as amended and
this was later formalised as Cap. 26. Sarawak also had a full Companies Ordinance (Cap. 86), first
passed in 1927 and updated several times during the 1930s and 1940s.
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Table 1.
(Continued)
England India Straits Settlements Federated Malay
States
Companies
(Amendment) Act,
1898
Companies
(Amendment)
Ordinance, 1909
— Companies
(Amendment)
Ordinance, 1914
British and Foreign
Companies
Enactment, 1910
British and Foreign
Companies
(Amendment)
Enactment, 1912
Directors Liability
Act, 1890
Companies
(Amendment) Act,
1900
Companies Act, 1907
Companies
(Consolidation) Act,
1908
Companies
(Winding-up) Rules,
1909
Companies Ordinance,
1915
Companies (Winding
Up) Rules, 1915
Companies
(Amendment)
Ordinance, 1916
Companies (Further
Amendment)
Ordinance, 1916
Companies
Enactment, 1917
— Companies Ordinance,
1923
Companies
(Amendment)
Ordinance, 1937
Companies
(Amendment)
Enactment, 1927
Companies Act, 1928
Companies Act, 1929
Companies Ordinance,
1940
Companies Ordinance,
1946
Companies
(Amendment)
Enactment, 1932
Malayan Union
Companies
Ordinance, 1946
Companies Act, 1947
Companies Act, 1948
[Australian Uniform
Companies Acts
1961-1962]
Singapore Companies
Act, 1967
Malaysian
Companies Act,
1965
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Singapore. The following descriptive account of the development of company law
will interweave the chronological developments in the Straits Settlements and Fed-
erated Malay States.23 Table 1 sets out the major company law changes in the Straits
Settlements and Federated Malay States indicating the laws’ antecedents in England
and India as a guide to this quite complicated story of company law diffusion.
A. The Late 19th Century
The first company legislation to have effect in the Straits Settlements was the Indian
Companies Act 1866. At that time the Straits Settlements was still subordinate to
Fort William in Bengal and this was one of the many Indian Acts which extended
to the Settlements. Not all Indian Acts applied in the Straits Settlements, and the
authorities in the Straits Settlements seemed to pick and choose which Indian Acts
they adopted.24 Although the earlier Indian Companies Acts of 1850, 1857 and 1860
may have had some minimal influence in the Straits Settlements, it appears that it was
the Act of 1866 that was used to incorporate the first companies in the colony. The
Indian Companies Act 1866 was based closely on the English Companies Act 1862,
and there was little attempt made to modify this law for the conditions in Indian, or
indeed in the Straits Settlements.25 India, by this time, had already experienced
debates around the question of limited liability and several booms and busts in
various corporate endeavours.26 The 1866Act, similarly worded and numbered as the
English Companies Act 1862 with nine parts and three schedules, provided that any
seven or more persons could form a limited or unlimited liability company. The 1866
Act removed the previous inability of insurance companies to be registered as limited
liability companies which were the last type of company to have this restriction. It had
provisions relating to most of the core principles of modern company law including
distribution of capital, internal management procedures, arbitration, and winding-
up. It also included a “Table A” of replaceable company rules. It did not reintroduce
the prohibition on a company buying its own shares which had existed in the earlier
Indian Act of 1857.27
As noted above, in 1867, the Straits Settlements became a separate Crown Colony,
with its own Governor and Legislative Council. Indian legislation continued to be in
force in the Straits Settlements until expressly overturned. The next relevant piece
of legislation, the Civil Law Ordinance IV of 1878 (Part II, s. 6), copying a similar
provision in Ceylon, brought into operation within the Straits Settlements a broad
body of English law current at the time including all questions or issues relating to
joint stock companies, unless other provision was made by statute enacted in the
colony. There had been an earlier general adoption of the common law and equity of
23 This account does not include reference to fire or life insurance or trust companies which were addi-
tionally regulated through separate laws in both the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States.
The account also does not analyse the Trading with the Enemy or Alien Enemies (Winding-Up) laws
first passed during World War I.
24 It was not until 1889 that a Commission was appointed to make an authoritative list of the Indian Acts in
force in the Straits Settlements. See G.W. Bartholomew et al., Sesquicentennial Chronological Tables
of the Written Laws of the Republic of Singapore 1834-1984 (Singapore: Malaya Law Review, 1987).
25 Rungta, supra note 7 at 212.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
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England in the Straits Settlements, and commercial matters at that time were being
decided mainly according to case law which was often based on English judicial
interpretations of English statutes that did not apply in the Straits Settlements. Hence,
this Civil Law Ordinance IV of 1878 was an instance of attempting to synchronise
local case law with English statutes.28 This move was understood in later case law
as intending to “secure uniformity of mercantile law in Singapore and the United
Kingdom”.29 However, it does not appear that this Ordinance had much impact on
the law of joint stock companies, or that any companies were actually incorporated
in the Straits Settlements under the relevant English Act of that time.
The first local company law was the Straits Settlements Companies Ordinance
of 1889 (No. V of 1889), which was passed to clear up the uncertainties created by
the Civil Law Ordinance of 1878 as to whether the Indian Act of 1866 had actually
been superseded by more recent English legislation. A further problem had arisen
where it had become very difficult to obtain a copy of the original Indian Act of
1866 as it had since been amended in India and so the older Act was out of print.
As the Attorney-General explained, “the public ought not to be bound under penalty
to obey laws the knowledge of which they have not the opportunity of attaining.”30
The Companies Ordinance of 1889 was also intended to take account of updates to
the company law in England, with the exception of the 1879 amendment which had
enabled existing unlimited banking companies to register with limited liability. This
was omitted as “[w]e have no such institutions here, and it is therefore unnecessary
to provide for such a contingency.”31 The Companies Ordinance of 1889 had nine
parts, with the most significant new section of the Ordinance relating to procedures
and court authorisation for the reduction of capital. It also formally established the
institution of the Registrar of Companies and provided for the creation of registries
in both Singapore and Penang.
Eight years later, in 1897, the Federated Malay States followed the lead of the
Straits Settlements Companies Ordinance of 1889 by passing matching enactments
in each of the four Federated States.32 A government report on Pahang for that year
noted that a large proportion of that year’s legislation was “designed to affect Euro-
peans, or to facilitate the conduct of Government business rather than to intimately
concern the native population of the State.”33 It is very likely that the Companies
28 The Civil Law Ordinance 1878 also adopted all existing English “mercantile law generally” in the Straits
Settlements. This broad wording came under consideration in much subsequent case law, and caused a
“century of uncertainty” as to the law in force. See Soon Choo Hock & Andrew Phang Boon Leong,
“Reception of English Commercial Law in Singapore—A Century of Uncertainty” in A.J. Harding,
ed., The Common Law in Singapore and Malaysia (Singapore: Butterworths, 1985) c. 2. However,
this debate is irrelevant to this particular discussion given that joint stock companies were explicitly
specified in the law.
29 Shaik Sahied bin Abdullah Bajerai v. Sockalingam Chettiar [1933] 1 A.C. 342 (P.C.) (Lord Atkin).
See Andrew Phang Boon Leong, The Development of Singapore Law: Historical and Socio-Legal
Perspectives (Singapore: Butterworths, 1990) at 44 [Phang, The Development of Singapore Law]; and
R.H. Hickling, “Civil Law (Amendment No. 2) Act, 1979 (No. 24) Section 5 of the Civil Law Act Snark
or Boojum?” (1979) 21 Mal. L. Rev. 351.
30 Straits Settlements, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, (21 December 1887) at B202-B203.
31 Ibid. at B203.
32 Perak Enactment No. 13 of 1897, Selangor Enactment No. 9 of 1897, Negeri Sembilan Enactment No. 11
of 1897, Pahang Enactment No. 19 of 1897.
33 Straits Settlements, Reports on the Federated Malay States for 1897, November 1898 (C-9108) at 59.
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Enactment 1897 would have been included in this category of laws designed to
mostly affect the activities of Europeans.
B. 1900-1910
In 1903, identical amendments to the 1897 Enactments were passed in each of the
four Federated Malay States with only one objective—the creation of an exception
to the rule prohibiting partnerships of more than 20 members unless registered as a
company. The exception was specifically for “associations of miners working under
the Chinese hun system”.34 The Chinese had been dominating tin production in
Malaya. From the 1880s, tin mining had been increasing in the Federated Malay
States and experienced a boom in 1898. Large numbers of Chinese were migrating
to the Federated Malay States attracted by the tin boom. Under the hun system, also
sometimes called the tribute or share system, mine workers were not paid fixed wages
but were shareholders and entitled to a share of the mine’s profits. The hun system
had become increasingly popular as it provided the chance of becoming rich if the
mine was successful. In 1903, 50 per cent of Chinese tin workers worked under
the hun system, 35 per cent were indentured, although the indenture system was
being phased out, while the remaining 15 per cent worked for fixed wages.35 This
amendment exempting the hun system from the prohibition on large partnerships
was passed because:36
[T]he associations come within the letter of the Companies Enactment 1897, but
they have not hitherto been required to observe its provisions, which are altogether
too elaborate for such cases, and it was desired to legally exempt them from its
obligations, and to make the exemption retrospective.
Colonial Office records show that the exception was considered to be “unobjec-
tionable legally or otherwise, and is clearly a matter in which we must be guided
by the man on the spot”.37 Although this amendment was certainly a response to
local practices, it was not an innovation in company regulation or an adaptation to
facilitate the local use of the company form, but rather a measure to maintain delin-
eation between the business practices of different population groups. This permissive
exception for the Chinese miners contradicted the general trend in mining and labour
regulation in the Federated Malay States of that time which was for “elimination of
the speculator” and the encouragement of more scientific, specifically British, tin
mining.38 The hun system in particular was widely seen as wasteful as the miners
34 Perak Enactment No. 4 of 1903, Selangor Enactment No. 2 of 1903; Negeri Sembilan Enactment No. 8
of 1903, Pahang No. 3 of 1903. These laws were passed prior to the creation of the Federal Council in
the Federated Malay States in 1909. At the time each state tended to pass the same laws (under British
direction) but in separate enactments.
35 Amarjit Kaur, “Labour Dynamics in the Plantation and Mining Sectors in Southeast Asia, 1840-1950: A
Historical Perspective” in Rebecca Elmhirst & Ratna Saptari, eds., Labour in Southeast Asia: Local
Processes in a Globalised World (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004) 47 at 56, 57; Yip Yat Hoong, The
Development of Tin Mining in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1969) at 78, 79.
36 Straits Settlements, “Report for the Secretary of State on Negeri Sembilan Enactment No. 8 of 1903
(The Companies Enactment 1897, Amendment Enactment 1903)” Original Correspondence (CO 273,
293/12546).
37 Ibid.
38 W.J.P. Hume & F.J.B. Dykes, Report and Proceedings of the Mining Conference, Held at Ipoh, Perak,
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would pick out the rich areas, work in small groups with neither capital nor knowl-
edge, and not obtain all the available tin.39 This British attitude towards the hun
system means that in all likelihood this legal change was not aimed at facilitating
Chinese mining but at merely avoiding uncertainty as to the application of the law.
Returning to the Straits Settlements, an amendment to the Companies Ordinance
was passed in 1909 (No. 4 of 1909) to extend the provisions of the English Amend-
ment of 1898 to the colony. This provided a remedy in cases where a contract of
payment of partly paid shares was not duly registered due to the carelessness of an
agent and caused loss to the shareholder.40 So, again, this was an update that slowly
brought the law of the Straits Settlements into closer alignment with that of England.
In 1910, shortly after the creation of the Federal Council, the Federated Malay
States passed the British and Foreign Companies Enactment (No. 17 of 1910) which
introduced a process for registering companies incorporated outside the Federated
Malay States and also provided for the holding of land by such companies. According
to the relevant Federal Council proceedings, the reason for the introduction of this
law was that only a very small number of companies had been incorporated in
the Federated Malay States up to that point (a total of 63 companies)—a small
proportion of the companies actually present in the territory. The stated objectives
of the law were the protection of investors so they could ascertain who they were
doing business with and to facilitate the registration of land titles.41 The Acting
Legal Advisor noted that the Bill followed “almost word for word except with the
alterations that are absolutely necessary to suit local conditions sections 274 and 275
of the Companies Consolidation Act passed at home in 1908”.42 These alterations
referred to included allowing companies to take four months rather than one month
to register and requiring the registration of the name and address of a local agent
designated to receive notices served on the company. This Enactment was slightly
amended in 191243 in response to objections raised by the Selangor Chamber of
Commerce which asked that the law be clarified as to exactly which companies
needed to register and to allow agents to be reimbursed by their company for fines
and expenses incurred under the Enactment.44
C. 1910s-1930s
In 1914, a local banking crisis in Singapore led to a significant reactionary amendment
to the Straits Settlements company law. The Straits Settlements Companies (Amend-
ment) Ordinance (No. 9 of 1914) required half-yearly auditing of banks, publication
of the audit statement and keeping all company accounts in English. Restrictions
1902); Francis Loh Kok Wah, Beyond the Tin Mines: Coolies, Squatters, and New Villages in the
Kinta Valley, Malaysia, C. 1880-1980 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988) at 16-18; Yip, supra
note 35 at 151.
39 Straits Settlements, Reports on the Federated Malay States for 1903 [Cd. 2243] (September 1904) at 11.
40 Straits Settlements, Original Correspondence (CO 273, 347/19744).
41 Federated Malay States, Federal Council Proceedings (31 October 1910) at B89, B90.
42 Ibid.
43 British and Foreign Companies (Amendment) Enactment (No. 9 of 1912).
44 Federated Malay States, Federal Council Proceedings (25 July 1912) at B42, B43.
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were also placed on directors of banks taking advances unless they provided security
which had to exceed the amount advanced by more than 30 per cent. These changes
were triggered by the collapse in 1913 of the Kwong Yik Banking and Insurance
Company. The Kwong Yik Bank, founded in 1903, was the first locally established
Chinese bank in Singapore. There had been a rising demand for banking services
among the growing Chinese population as many did not speak English and preferred
to avoid the English banks. Kwong Yik was founded by Wong Ah Fook, a leading
building contractor and gambier planter, and supported by Loke Yew, who began in
mining and diversified into revenue farming, rubber, tobacco and trading,45 to serve
the Cantonese community. It was successful until November 1913 when rumours
of financial difficulties led to a run on the bank and it became unable to honour its
liabilities. It suspended payment to customers and subsequently went into liquida-
tion.46 Small depositors experienced losses47 and there were consequent effects for
local Chinese firms that had been customers of the bank,48 including “several large
and complicated bankruptcies”.49
The failure was blamed on lack of adherence to banking principles, assets shown
in the balance sheets not being readily realisable and directors making advances
to themselves without security. There was a public outcry after the failure and a
demand for a government response.50 This pressure included complaints from the
small Chinese depositors, but was mainly from British interests wanting to control
Chinese business practices due to the suspicion that the Chinese may have been
using the limited liability form as a front for traditional business practices.51 For
example, an editorial published by The Straits Times following the Kwong Yik crisis
bemoaned the Chinese use of credit rather than capital, and claimed that depositors
did not know that Kwong Yik was a company registered under English law but was
operating with Chinese principles. The editorial noted “there [was] a serious danger
in the imperfect grafting of two absolutely different systems.”52 Due to such public
pressure, an Amendment Bill was quickly brought to the Legislative Council.
Proceedings of the Legislative Council in 1914 indicate that the original proposed
response to the Kwong Yik crisis was to ban directors of banks from taking advances
45 Edmund Terence Gomez, Chinese Business in Malaya: Accumulation, Ascendance, Accommodation
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999) at 29, 30.
46 Sheng-Yi Lee, “The Development of Commercial Banking in Singapore and the States of Malaya”
(1966) 11 Malayan Economic Review 84; Rosalind Chew, “Local Chinese Banks in Singapore” in
Leo Suryadinata, ed., Chinese Adaptation and Diversity: Essays on Society and Literature in Indone-
sia, Malaysia & Singapore (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1993) 57; Shuang Yann Wong,
“Cross-National Ethnic Networks in Financial Services: A Case Study of Local Banks in Singapore” in
Claes G. Alvstam & Eike W. Schamp, eds., Linking Industries Across the World: Processes of Global
Networking (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) 243 at 257; Tan Ee Leong, “The Chinese Banks Incorporated
in Singapore and the Federation of Malaya” in Thomas Henry Silcock, ed., Readings in Malayan
Economics (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 1961) 454.
47
“Bank Suspends: Result of a Rush on Local Concern” The Straits Times (20 November 1913) 9.
48
“Big Chinese Firm in Difficulties” The Straits Times (26 December 1913) 10; “Kwong Yik Results.”
The Straits Times (3 December 1913) 8.
49 Colonial Reports—Annual, No. 862, Straits Settlements Report for 1914 (Singapore: His Majesty’s
Stationery Office 1915) (Cd 7622-53) at 10.
50
“The Company Law” The Straits Times (9 December 1913) 8.
51
“Legislative Council” The Straits Times (2 March 1914) 8. Also see discussion in Part IV below on
Chinese kongsi forms.
52
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altogether. This clause was opposed by three Unofficial members of the Legislative
Council, including the representative of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce, on
the basis that it was not part of the company law in any other British colony.53 They
dubbed it “grandmotherly legislation”54 and argued that the measure was only being
proposed due to panic.55 In response, the clause was watered down from a total
prohibition on taking advances to being a requirement for the provision of adequate
security for advances to directors. The more lenient amendment was still opposed by
the Unofficial members but was nonetheless passed by the majority, most of whom
were Official government bureaucrats, on the basis that it was necessary in the face
of the crisis and that it would prove to be generally acceptable.56
The failure of the Kwong Yik Bank also exposed the fact that account books kept
in Chinese were, in the words of the Attorney-General, inaccessible to “all reputable
firms of auditors”.57 This triggered the legislative requirement for the exclusive
use of English. Mr. Tan Jiak Kim, another Unofficial member (the sole Chinese
representative and a member of the Chinese Advisory Board) of the Legislative
Council,58 supported the control of advances made to directors, but argued that
there were strong feelings against the proposed requirement for accounts to be kept
in English amongst the Chinese community.59 His protest did not affect the final
outcome on this point.60 Records show that no objections were raised to these
changes in the Colonial Office in London as “this seems a reasonable and proper
amendment if any check is to be kept on Chinese finance”.61
In the following year, the Straits Settlements Legislative Council passed a new
Companies Ordinance (No. 25 of 1915). The drafting of this law had actually begun
before the Kwong Yik crisis and the hasty amendments of 1914. The Ordinance
was considered by the Legislative Council during the latter part of 1914 and first
half of 1915. The main purpose was to adopt the initiatives of the English Com-
panies Act of 1908, particularly to include the updates on information disclosure
in prospectuses. The 1915 Ordinance saw the first introduction of provisions on
compromises and arrangements. It was also the point in time where the replaceable
rule on shareholder voting was changed to the one-share-one-vote principle. The
winding-up rules passed in 1915 pursuant to this Ordinance were almost an exact
copy of the English rules of 1909. Records of the Legislative Council indicate that
these updates were uncontentious, and debates revolved mainly around revisiting
the 1914 amendment that restricted directors of banking companies from taking
advances. The Unofficials, particularly the representative of the Singapore Chamber
53 Although note that in Victoria, Australia, banking companies were prohibited from granting advances
to directors or officers (Companies Act 1896 (Vic.), ss. 45, 46).
54 Straits Settlements, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, (27 February 1914, 13 March 1914).
55 Straits Settlements, Original Correspondence (CO 273, 407/16042).
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 For an account of the contributions of Tan Jiak Kim and other Chinese Unofficial representatives to the
Straits Settlements Legislative Council, see Daniel P.S. Goh, “Unofficial Contentions: The Postcolo-
niality of Straits Chinese Political Discourse in the Straits Settlements Legislative Council” (2010) 41
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 483.
59 For coverage of Chinese sentiment on the issue, see “Local Company Law: Some Notes on the Position”,
The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (6 March 1914) 6.
60 Straits Settlements, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, (13 February 1914) at B13-B17.
61 Straits Settlements, Original Correspondence (CO 273, 407/16042).
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of Commerce, continued to oppose the inclusion of the 1914 amendments, but once
again they were overruled by the majority.62
In 1916, two amendments were made to the Straits Settlements Companies Ordi-
nance.63 The first mainly concerned the registration of company mortgages, such
that “our law… will be exactly on the same footing with the law that obtains in
England”.64 The second amendment concerned the definitions of the annual general
meeting and the statutory general meeting and provided that unclaimed assets of
companies were to be handed to the Official Receiver. There was little discussion of
the reasons for this amendment and it appeared to be treated as being merely of tech-
nical import.65 These amendments of 1916, therefore, were examples of apolitical
technical updates, rather than of local adaptive change.
In 1917, the Federated Malay States passed an almost word-for-word copy of
the Straits Settlements Companies Ordinance 1915, including the provisions on the
restricting of making advances to directors and the requirement for all books of
account to be kept in English. The only notable difference between the two pieces
of legislation was the retention, in the Federated Malay States Enactment, of the
1903 exception for hun Chinese miners to the rule against large partnerships. This
Companies Enactment 191766 was advertised to be “embodying modern develop-
ments of the English law relating to companies”.67 In its first reading in the Federal
Council, the Legal Advisor (Frederick Belfield) presented this new law as a straight-
forward and logical matter of keeping up with developments in England and the
Straits Settlements:68
[W]hen the English Companies Consolidation Act of 1908 became law it was
felt out here that something ought to be done here to bring the company law
up to date. We have waited in this matter, as in so many other matters, upon
the Colony of the Straits Settlements, and the Colony did not proceed to amend
its Company Ordinance until the end of 1915, when it passed a new Ordinance
following very closely, so far as local circumstances permitted, the terms of the
English Act of 1908. That having been done, action was taken in these States, and
the present bill was drafted early last year… this voluminous measure… follows
very closely the provisions of the English Act and of the corresponding Straits
Settlements Ordinance, and that will no doubt be sufficient to commend it to
members of this Council.
The only note of contention in the debates for this Enactment came in the Committee
discussion when an Unofficial member, Mr. A.N. Kenion,69 opposed a clause giving
62 Straits Settlements, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, (2 October 1914) at B66-B70; (27 August
1915) at B74-B76.
63 Companies (Amendment) Ordinance No. 8 of 1916 (S.S.) and Companies (Further Amendment)
Ordinance No. 22 of 1916 (S.S.).
64 Straits Settlements, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, (28 April 1916) at B18, B19.
65 Straits Settlements, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, (29 September 1916) at B65, B66.
66 Federated Malay States Enactment No. 20 of 1917 (came into force on 1 April 1918).
67 [Untitled] The Straits Times (19 February 1917) 8.
68 Federated Malay States, Proceedings of the Federal Council of the Federated Malay States (24 July
1917) at B11, B12.
69 A.N. Kenion was a junior partner of law firm Maxwell and Kenion that was founded in 1905 in Ipoh. He
became senior partner in 1911. He was appointed as Unofficial member of the Federal Council of the
Federated Malay States in 1915. It was the first time that a lawyer from Ipoh had been appointed to the
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the Registrar of Companies powers to impose a fine himself (rather than via an
independent magistrate) for non-deliverance of forms. Kenion reasoned “it is a very
bad thing to have in a Bill… it is purely local, they have not got it at Home… If
this were a good thing I feel certain that it would be found in England.” He was
countered by the Legal Advisor who merely stated “the circumstances are different
here.”70 Kenion then objected to certain fines and argued that the Federated Malay
States need not necessarily always follow the Straits Settlements, saying “I think it
is a very bad principle to always go following the Colony… I certainly think we
should set the example and let them follow us”, but again he was overruled by the
majority.71
In 1923, the Straits Settlements passed a new Companies Ordinance.72 Accord-
ing to the Legislative Council proceedings, it was intended to resolve numerous
unspecified “defects” in the 1915 Ordinance and the few amendments made to it
afterwards.73 Almost all of the drafting work on this Ordinance was done by the
Registrar of Companies—Mr. Charles James Saunders.74 The Singapore and Penang
Chambers of Commerce and the Singapore Bar Committee were given the chance to
critique the proposed Bill.75 This was one of the few instances where a company law
update in Malaya was not specifically precipitated by reforms in the U.K., however,
in the first reading of the Bill the Attorney-General described the changes as being
“almost entirely concern[ed with] technical details [that do] not touch on princi-
ples.”76 Only minor changes were made in the committee process. This Ordinance
did require non-local private companies to file balance sheets (s. 290(4)) as “there
had been some trouble”77 on this issue. It also inserted a provision (s. 111) prohibit-
ing banks from making loans on the security of their own shares, as it had come
to the attention of the legislature that a local bank did not have such a prohibition
in its articles which was thought to be dangerous in light of the Kwong Yik case.78
This section led to a Straits Settlements court ruling that securities on shares were
void between a bank and shareholder, but this was reversed by the Privy Council,79
leaving the section easily evaded.80
Council which had been dominated by miners and planters. Kenion “showed an independence of mind
that often irked the High Commissioner”. See Ho Tak Ming, Ipoh: When Tin was King (Ipoh: Perak
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73 Straits Settlements, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, (26 February 1923) at B18.
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The Federated Malay States made some fairly minor amendments to its Compa-
nies Enactment in 1927 and 193281 but this time there was not a wholesale adoption
of the Straits Settlements Ordinance. In 1927, companies incorporated in the Fed-
erated Malay States were permitted to keep branch share registries in the U.K. or
in any other British colony. The 1932 amendment incorporated the content of the
British and Foreign Companies Enactment 1912 into the main Companies Enact-
ment 1917 as amended. It also introduced fines for being a member of an illegal
company or partnership (i.e. of unincorporated banks of more than ten members and
large unincorporated partnerships outside the hun system exception), as well as fines
and penal sanctions for managers of such companies. The stated intention of the
Amendment was to bring the law in the Federated Malay States into closer assimila-
tion with that of the Straits Settlements, improve the drafting and clarity of the law,
and to adopt the English Act of 1929 on registration of mortgages and charges even
though the Straits Settlements had not done likewise.82 The Straits Settlements also
passed a minor amendment in 1937 regarding restrictions on company names and
allowing the registration of companies with social objectives without the use of the
word “Limited”.83
D. 1940s-1960s
In 1940, the Straits Settlements Companies Ordinance 1940 was enacted. This was
largely based on the English Companies Act 1929. There does not appear to be any
written record as to why it took over a decade for the Straits Settlements to catch up
with English company law developments. This Bill was prepared by a special com-
mittee chaired by the Singapore Registrar of Companies with committee members
representing the Singapore Chamber of Commerce, the Singapore Bar and a chartered
accounting firm.84 This seemed to be the first time when local interest groups were
directly involved in the drafting of company legislation in Malaya. Nonetheless,
there was little evidence of their impact. According to The Straits Times:85
[The Ordinance’s] object is to bring the company law of the colony into line with
that of England.
Wherever possible the exact words of the Companies Act, 1929, have been
followed so as to obtain the benefit of English cases but in some clauses modifi-
cation was necessary to adapt the law to local conditions or to conform to other
laws of the colony.
The Bill was described by theAttorney-General as “largely non-contentious”86 and it
raised little comment in the Legislative Council.87 As Calvert noted, the propensity
to follow the English law verbatim was particularly evident in one provision (s. 107)
81 Federated Malay States Enactment No. 19 of 1927 and Enactment No. 40 of 1932.
82 Federated Malay States, Supplement to the Federated Malay States Gazette (13 August 1932) at 2386.
83 Companies (Amendment) Ordinance No. 27 of 1937 (S.S.). There is no record in the Proceedings of
the Legislative Council as to the reasons behind this particular amendment.
84 Supra note 78 at vii.
85
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86 Straits Settlements, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, (8 November 1939) at B124.
87 Straits Settlements, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, (26 August 1940) at B106-B109.
Sing. J.L.S. Legal Transplants and Adaptation in a Colonial Setting 139
which wrongly cross-referenced to the English numbering of sections rather than to
the Straits Settlements numbering.88
Still, there were some differences between the original and transplanted pieces
of legislation. In the 1940 Ordinance, the 1914 amendments that resulted from
the Kwong Yik case were mostly retained but refined. The Ordinance kept the
requirement for all company accounts to be in English. It was the sections on
advances to directors which the drafting Committee found most difficult.89 The
Committee considered that checks were still needed as “local bank directors have
not been brought up in the cautious traditions of British banking and the Committee
know from their own experience that many of them have ideas which would be
deemed wildly irresponsible in Lombard Street”.90 However, the Committee found
no good reason to fix the security required for an advance to directors at the existing
30 per cent above the value of the advance, and left the class of security and amount of
margin to the discretion of the Board (s. 137(1)). The prohibition on loans on shares
for banks and insurance companies was also extended to ordinary trading companies
(s. 47). There were a number of other minor differences between the 1940 Ordinance
and the English law.91 These did not modify any of the core principles in the English
company law, but two sections were identified by Calvert as likely to have been
influenced by local entrepôt trading conditions and the presence of many foreign
companies.92 First, s. 261(3) provided that where an officer of a company had sent
out of the State property obtained on credit and not paid for it he would be deemed
to have disposed of it other than in the course of business rendering him liable to
imprisonment and fines. Secondly, s. 266 gave the Court power to restrain certain
persons with special knowledge of a company’s affairs from leaving the colony and
provided for their arrest if departure was imminent.
During World War II and the Japanese occupation of the Malay Peninsula and
Singapore (1941–1945) there was complete disruption to the law-making process.
There were some post-war amendments made to the Straits Settlements Companies
Ordinance in 1946.93 These provisions deemed existing companies to have been
incorporated in the colony, extended indemnity to companies that had failed to file
returns during the war years and provided for the reestablishment of company oper-
ations where they had lapsed. That same year, the Malayan Union was established
to amalgamate the different Malayan administrations with the exception of Singa-
pore. In Singapore, the Straits Settlements Companies Ordinance 1940 as amended
remained in force throughout the period that Singapore was an independent colony,
88 H.G. Calvert, “Commercial Law” in George Williams Keeton and L.A. Sheridan, eds., Malaya and
Singapore, The Borneo Territories: The Development of Their Laws and Constitutions, vol. 9 of The
British Commonwealth: The Development of Its Laws and Constitution (London: Stevens & Sons Lim-
ited, 1961) 395 at 401. Note, however, that the copy of the 1940 Ordinance consulted for this paper had
the correct numbering.
89 Supra note 78 at xiii.
90 Ibid.
91 See Calvert, supra note 88 for a discussion of these differences. See also O.C. Smalley, Changes in
Company Law and Accounts (Singapore: Peter Chong & Co, 1941) for a list of differences between the
1940 and 1923 Ordinances.
92 Calvert, ibid. at 403.
93 Companies (Special Provisions) No. 17 of 1946 (S.S.); Companies (Special Provisions) Amendment
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and then during its amalgamation with, and then secession from, Malaysia.94 In the
Malayan Union, the Companies Ordinance 194695 adopted the Straits Settlements
Companies Ordinance 1940 as amended and replaced the company law statutes pre-
viously applicable in the Federated Malay States and the Unfederated States. This
law continued to apply in the Federation of Malaya and later in the Federation of
Malaysia until the mid-1960s.96 By the early 1960s, the 1940 Ordinance was criti-
cised as being “as old as the Fort of Malacca”.97 A new Companies Act was passed
in Malaysia in 1965, and a similar Act in Singapore in 1967, which took particular
inspiration from legal developments in Australia.98
E. Other Sources of Law
This account of the development of company law in Malaya has been almost entirely
statutory. The court structure was well-developed in both the Straits Settlements and
Federated Malay States. The courts theoretically enjoyed considerable discretion to
tailor English laws to local circumstances based on principles of justice and conve-
nience, but there was reluctance on the part of the British barristers who staffed the
courts to do this in practice.99 According to Phang’s research on colonial contract
law cases, judgements tended to be mostly impartial and did not necessarily favour
British economic interests.100 Although there are a number of reported company
law cases for both the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States from the
colonial era,101 none appear to have set any important precedents. Calvert noted that
Malayan courts tended to follow the lead of their English counterparts in matters
of commercial law.102 Another reason for the lack of innovation through case law
was that the Registrar of Companies tended to be limited to administrative functions
including registration, filing papers, liquidations and data collection. Prosecution
94 Singapore Order in Council 1946 (S. R. & O., 1946, No. 462, U.K.), art. 42; Constitution of the State
of Singapore 1963, art. 105; Republic of Singapore Independence Act 1965 (1985 Rev. Ed.), art. 13.
95 Malayan Union Ordinance No. 13 of 1946. See also Federation of Malaya Companies (Amendment)
Ordinance No. 8 of 1948.
96 The Federation of Malaya Order in Council 1948 (S. R. & O., 1948, No. 108, U.K.), art. 135; Federation
of Malaya Independence Act 1957 (5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 60), art. 2; Agreement Relating to Malaysia 1963,
Annex A, art. 73; Malaysia Act 1963, art. 3.
97 Geoffrey Boland, “The Magna Carta of Malaysian Company Law” The Straits Times (20 June 1965)
6. Note also that Pistor et al., “The Evolution of Corporate Law”, supra note 3, identify this hiatus
between 1940 and 1965 as evidence of stagnation in Malaysia’s company law development.
98 The drafting committee for the Malaysian legislation considered the English Companies Act 1948 (11,
12 Geo. VI, c. 38), the Australian Uniform Companies Acts 1961-1962, the U.K. Cohen and Jenkins
Reports, and the draft code that had been prepared for Ghana (Malaysia, Parliamentary Debates, (9
August 1965)). The committee was assisted under the Australian Colombo plan, by Mr. John Finemore,
Victoria’s Assistant State Parliamentary Draftsman (see Geoffrey Boland, ibid.).
99 Connie Carter, Eyes on the Prize: Law and Economic Development in Singapore (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 2002) at 49, 50.
100 See Phang, The Development of Singapore Law, supra note 29 at 60.
101 The following law reports were consulted: Straits Settlements Law Reports (1893-1923); James William
Norton Kyshe, Cases Heard and Determined in Her Majesty’s Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements
1808-1804; Law Reports of the Federated Malay States (1906-1941); James McCabe Reay, Federated
Malay States: A Digest of Reported Cases 1897-1925; H.C. Willan, The Federated Malay States Digest,
1936.
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was rare, usually only for failing to file balance sheets and annual lists of members
with the Registrar, and sometimes waived in lieu of summary fines.103 There were
also no stock exchange rules to mention for this era because, although there were pri-
vate stock brokerage firms and associations104 dealing in shares incorporated locally
and abroad, there was no public stock exchange in Singapore or the Malay Peninsula
until the 1960s.105
F. The Legal Developments in Malaya and the Theoretical Debates
Following this account of the development of company law in Malaya, we can make
some preliminary remarks about the three debates outlined in the Introduction. With
regards to the question of the significance of legal family in comparison with the
transplant effect, it is clear that there were no fundamental departures from the English
company law principles in Malaya. The core features of English company law were
all imported wholesale. It is true that the “imitatory machinery”106 was usually slow
in colonial Malaya but it did catch up regularly to English developments. There was
not a pattern of either erratic or stagnant legal development as Pistor et al. predicted
for transplant countries, but rather of reasonably frequent copying with relatively
few adaptations to local conditions. There were certainly some local adaptations,
but most of these were relatively minor technical changes made to facilitate colonial
administrative procedures. The major exception was the Kwong Yik crisis in 1913
where a public demand for change was acted upon and these amendments remained
part of the law for many years to come. It follows, then, that the total number of
legislative changes in colonial Malaya was not evidence of innovation or adaptability
to the local environment107 but instead indicate a close adherence to the pattern of
“Home”.
What we have described in Malaya is a series of transplants and updates rather
than just one original transplant (as was implicitly assumed by the “legal origins”
theorists). Further, many of these transplants were not imported directly from the
metropolis, but rather were adopted from other British colonies. The company law
of the Straits Settlements came originally via India, was modified by the adoption of
a provision from Ceylon, and then was transplanted to the Federated Malay States,
with some divergences from English law picked up along the way.108 To our knowl-
edge, such patterns of inter-colony legal diffusion have not been acknowledged in
the comparative company law literature. Nonetheless, there were no borrowings
103 Aiman Nariman Bt Mohd. Sulaiman, “Corporate Administrative Regulation: A Historical Study of the
Role of the Registrar of Companies” (2000) 8 International Islamic University of Malaysia Law Journal
21.
104 The Singapore Stock Brokers’Association was formed in 1930, and renamed the Malayan Stock Brokers’
Association in 1938.
105 P.J. Drake, “The New-Issue Boom in Malaya and Singapore, 1961-1964” (1969) 18 Economic
Development and Cultural Change 73.
106 Calvert, supra note 88.
107 Hence this evidence for Malaya does not support the approach of Pistor et al., “The Evolution of
Corporate Law”, supra note 3, who used the frequency of major legislative changes as one indicator of
company law adaptability.
108 The same pattern was seen in North Borneo (Sabah) which took its company laws from India and the
Straits Settlements rather than directly from England, see supra note 22.
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from non-British sources and the colonies retained the core English company law
principles.
With regard to the question of company law as “imperialism”, we can distinguish
between issues of intent and of outcome. There was no evidence in the legislative
records of any explicit intention to change the law to facilitate imperialist objec-
tives, although this was probably an implicit assumption made by law-makers when
passing “catch-up” legislation. At the same time, in the legislative proceedings over
almost a century in both the Federated Malay States and the Straits Settlements, there
was no discussion of which groups the company law was intended to benefit or of
whether the law was having beneficial effects, although there certainly was suspicion
among the British of local Chinese business practices and a desire to control them
through law. The process for registering British and foreign companies in both the
Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States and allowing them to own land more
obviously facilitated imperialist objectives than did the law enabling local company
formation. In terms of outcome, again we note the low levels of adaptability of the
law to account for local usage and practices. The actual use of the law is explored
more fully in the following section.
IV. Colonial Capitalism, Race, and the Use of the Limited
Liability Company in Malaya
The company law developments described above had few connections to local eco-
nomic or political developments. There was also a marked disconnect between the
legal developments and the actual use of the limited liability company in British
Malaya. Data on local company incorporations in the Straits Settlements and the
Federated Malay States, although not available for every year, show consistently
small numbers of new companies being registered locally (see Table 2). In the
Straits Settlements, during the last decade of the 19th century, fewer than ten new
companies were incorporated annually. For example, in 1889, eight joint stock com-
panies were registered in Singapore, two under the Indian Companies Act 1866 and
six under the local Companies Ordinance 1889. These eight were mainly steamship
and mining companies. Two companies were also registered that year in Penang—a
dock company and a steam navigation company.109 Then, throughout the first half
of the 20th century, local incorporations averaged about 30 each year. There was
a spike in new incorporations with the rubber boom with 67 companies created in
the Straits Settlements in 1910, and another spike in 1920 probably associated with
the short boom period following the First World War with 73 new companies that
year. In 1927, 70 new companies were formed due to the tin boom, but otherwise
the numbers remained steady. In the Federated Malay States, there were similar but
slightly smaller numbers except for 1937 when 80 new companies were incorpo-
rated where 50 of them were motor transport companies responding to incorporation
requirements under the Transport Board Enactment of that year.110 It was only after
World War II that there was a marked increase in the numbers of new local companies
registering in both jurisdictions.
109
“Government Gazette, 28th Feb.” The Straits Times Weekly Issue (4 March 1890) 9.
110 C.D. Ahearn, Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the Federated Malay
States for 1937 (Kuala Lumpur: Federated Malay States Government Press, 1938) at 133.
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Table 2.
New Company Incorporations and Total Nominal Capital in the Straits Settlements and
Federated Malay States by Year.
Year Singapore Penang Federated Malay States
Straits Settlements
Total New 
Incorporations
Total Nominal 
Capital (Straits 
Dollars)
Total New 
Incorporations
Total Nominal 
Capital (Straits 
Dollars)
1889 8 2 $2,293,100 The Federated Malay States did 
not pass company enactments until 
1897. 
1890 5 2 $1,544,350
1891 6 $1,041,005
1892 4 0 $665,000
1893 0 0 $0
1894 6 $196,000
1895 7 $728,000
1896 5 $609,000
1897 7 $1,330,003
1898 7
1900 17
1904 8
1906 19
1907 14 
1908 13 5 $2,201,750
1909 41 8 $12, 300,000 63 
cumulatively 
to this date
1910 67 16 $31, 185,000 18 $3,270,000
1911 25 7 $910,000*
1912 31 10 $1,465,000∗ 16
1913 36 12 $58,813,072
1914 18 6 $550,000∗
1915 7 2 $1,810,000 20
1916 41 $13,116,400 24 $6,397,714
1917 40 $24,545,500 44 $16,182,428
1918 35 $12,493,000 14
1919 48 27 $7,102,000
1920 73 54 $38,934,928
1921 21 8 $16,270,000 30 $4,988,000
1922 32 5 $12,070,000 20 $3,708,700
1923 39 $10,452,500 22 $12,367,784
1924 43 $20,527,857 25 $12,324,763
1925 36 $14,480,300 38
1926 61 $30,085,600 56 $35,764,500
1927 70 $28,205,571
1928 52 $19,370,683 22
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Table 2.
(Continued)
Year Singapore Penang Federated Malay States
Straits Settlements
Total New 
Incorporations
Total Nominal 
Capital (Straits 
Dollars)
Total New 
Incorporations
Total Nominal 
Capital (Straits 
Dollars)
1929 48 $13,451,000 32
1930 41 $13,424,000 32 $7,013,000
1931 22 $8,748,769
1932 26 $7,376,857
1933 15 $2,648,000
1934 26 $6,090,000
1935 49 $21,123,103 24 $5,041,642
1936 34 $9,125,156
1937 80 $10,755,857
1938 59 $13,909,285
1948 126 $59,533,000 122# $38,220,000
1949 111 $80.940,100 90 $20,361,000
1950 125 $99,520,000 107 $47,637,100
1951 110 163 $70,972,800 
1952 133 $117,162,000 191 $77,545,000
∗Penang data only.
#The data for 1948 to 1952 refers to the Federation of Malaya.
Source: Amalgamated data based on Annual Reports of the Registry of Companies for Singa-
pore, Penang, the Federated Malay States and the Federation of the Malaya as re-reported in the
Proceedings of the Straits Settlements Legislative Council, Federated Malay States Government
Gazette, Annual Colonial Reports tabled in the House of Commons, Straits Times, and Federated
Malay States Chamber of Commerce Year Books. The blank spaces and missing years indicate
that no data was found.
These comparatively small numbers of local incorporations are explained due to
the initially low take-up of the limited liability company form for British entrepôt
trade in the Straits Settlements and because the Chinese settlers were largely left to
their own devices, although some did eventually make use of the company form.
Later, the predominance of London-registered companies operating in Malaya and
the massive capital flows back to the metropolis kept local capital accumulation at
low levels.111 There was also little use of the limited liability company form by the
Indian and Malay populations in British Malaya. The details of these factors are set
out below.
From the 1820s through to the rubber boom of the early 20th century, British
merchants in Singapore were mainly sole traders or worked in small partnerships
and depended on trade credit from British suppliers which they then extended to
Asian middlemen. These British traders had very little personal capital and there is
no evidence of importation of any great amounts of capital to the colony.112 Merchant
111 Michael Stenson, Class, Race and Colonialism inWest Malaysia: The Indian Case (St. Lucia: University
of Queensland Press, 1980) at 32.
112 J.H. Drabble & P.J. Drake, “The British Agency Houses in Malaysia: Survival in a Changing World”
(1981) 12 Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 297.
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firms were built up by reinvesting profits. Although, in the second half of the 19th
century, these merchant firms began to diversify by becoming agents for British
banks and shipping lines and increased their speculation in mining and plantations
(often using Chinese capital), they generally remained unincorporated.113 In the late
19th century a small wave of companies were registered in Britain to mine tin in
Malaya but most of these failed as they could not compete with the Chinese miners
who had better access to cheap labour.114
The Straits Chinese during most of the 19th century were left to govern themselves
through their kongsi (types of shareholding partnerships with additional social and
political functions) and “secret society” organisations. The British appointed Capi-
tans China, who were also usually leaders of the secret societies, to rule the Chinese
population. The Chinese dominated the tin mining sector in Malaya up until the
1920s. The majority of early investment in mining in the Malay Peninsula was made
by Straits Chinese merchants who used the secret society and clan associations to
build trust and to facilitate the importation of Chinese labourers.115 These merchants
used middlemen “mines advancers” who would often act in multiple roles as tin mine
owner, shopkeeper, ore dealer and tax farm operator.116 The largest kongsi networks
and secret societies also reaped huge profits from the colonial revenue farm sys-
tem, particularly the lucrative opium farms, and these farms functioned at times like
savings banks for Chinese entrepreneurs.117 The commercial and political success
of the secret societies was eventually seen as a threat by the British and they were
declared illegal in 1889.118 As a consequence secret societies were driven under-
ground, and this eroded their ability to control the tin mine workers in Malaya.119
Colonial policies also abolished all opium and gambling revenue farms by 1909 thus
decreasing Chinese access to capital.
These developments prompted some Chinese entrepreneurs, particularly former
opium revenue farmers, to turn to the limited liability corporate form and they
founded banks, insurance companies and financial empires.120 Falling within the
ambit of British law, the early Chinese banks in Singapore, such as the Kwong Yik
Bank discussed above, had to be incorporated. Although Chinese businesses may
have made compromises with Western-style corporate forms, old kongsi structures
and family-based business relationships probably continued to underpin their activ-
ities.121 Not all Chinese turned to the corporate form; kongsi structures and the hun
113 Ibid.; Van Helten & Jones, supra note 18 at 160.
114 Van Helten & Jones, ibid. at 164; Yip, supra note 35 at 96-99.
115 James C. Jackson, Planters and Speculators: Chinese and European Agricultural Enterprise in Malaya
1786-1921 (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1968) at 4; Gomez, supra note 45 at 28.
116 Jomo Kwame Sundaram, A Question of Class: Capital, the State, and Uneven Development in Malaya
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986) at 161 [Jomo, A Question of Class].
117 Carl A. Trocki, “Boundaries and Transgressions: Chinese Enterprise in Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Century Southeast Asia” in Aihwa Ong & Donald M. Nonini, eds., Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural
Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism (NewYork and London: Routledge, 1997) 61 at 74 [Trocki,
“Boundaries and Transgressions”].
118 Secret Societies Ordinance 1889 (S.S.).
119 R. H. Hickling, “Influence of the Chinese Upon Legislative History in Malaysia and Singapore” (1978)
20 Mal. L. Rev. 265 at 276; Van Helten & Jones, supra note 18 at 167.
120 Trocki, “Boundaries and Transgressions”, supra note 117 at 82.
121 Ibid. The Khaw group of Penang, a Chinese family empire, was a prominent example of a hybrid
combination of Western styles of business enterprise with traditional Malayan Chinese family-business
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mining system continued to exist and, as noted above, were tolerated by the British
colonial legal system.122 Some Chinese businesses were competitive with Western
interests and others were complementary,123 but most remained small-scale trading
and petty business ventures, and generally did not threaten the larger, better-financed,
British enterprises.124
It was the rapid spread of rubber plantations that truly brought the limited liability
company into use for investment in Malaya, although the sector remained dominated
by London-registered “sterling” companies over local “Straits dollar” companies.125
The invention of rubber pneumatic tyres in 1888 and demand from the world auto-
mobile industry propelled investment in rubber. During the early years, planters
were mainly self-financed or assisted by relatives and friends or through private
syndicates,126 but there was some corporate activity. Some early rubber companies
(1899–1900s) were formed in Scotland as many of the planters were Scots. Then,
between 1903 and 1912 approximately 260 companies were floated in the United
Kingdom to cultivate rubber in Malaya.127 Some local rubber companies were also
formed by resident European and Chinese investors.128 Agency houses were often
entrusted with the management of these plantations. The agency houses assumed
limited liability status in the early 1900s—for example, Guthries in 1902, and Har-
risons and Crosfield in 1908.129 This change in status was triggered by the large
financial risks which they were suddenly assuming on behalf of the newly establish-
ing rubber companies.130 Being incorporated also provided the agency houses with
access to finance on the London stock market.131 Then the sharp rise in the price
of rubber in 1909–1910, and the phenomenal dividends paid by existing compa-
nies, produced a boom in new rubber plantation companies promoted on the London
Stock Exchange and speculation was widespread. As noted above, there was also
an increase in locally established “dollar” companies, although this was far less sig-
nificant than the London-based boom. The new companies took over many existing
small holders, including those owned by the Chinese. Many new plantations were
also established in response to the boom.132 The boom lasted only briefly, and then
the numbers of new rubber companies being created declined substantially after 1914
practices. See also CarlA. Trocki, “Opium and the Beginnings of Chinese Capitalism in SoutheastAsia”
(2002) 33 Journal of SoutheastAsian Studies 297 at 314; and J.W. Cushman, “The Khaw Group: Chinese
Business in Early Twentieth Century Penang” (1986) 17 Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 58.
122 See e.g., Tai Shin v. Chung Moi (1906) F.M.S.L.R. 1 where the court was called on to settle a dispute
involving a tin mining kongsi between the advancer and the shareholder-labourers.
123 George Cyril Allen & Audrey G. Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya: A Study in
Economic Development (London: Allen & Unwin, 1957) at 59.
124 Gomez, supra note 45 at 28.
125 Nicholas J. White, Business, Government, and the End of Empire: Malaya, 1942-1957 (Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1996).
126 John H. Drabble, “Investment in the Rubber Industry in Malaya c. 1900-1922” (1972) 3 Journal of
Southeast Asian Studies 247 at 247 [Drabble, “Investment in the Rubber Industry”].
127 Drabble & Drake, supra note 112; John H. Drabble, “Some Thoughts on the Economic Development
of Malaya under British Administration” (1974) 5 Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 199 [Drabble,
“Some Thoughts on the Economic Development”].
128 Van Helten & Jones, supra note 18 at 172.
129 Ibid.
130 Drabble & Drake, supra note 112 at 308.
131 Jomo, A Question of Class, supra note 116 at 183, 184.
132 Ibid. at 247.
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and many of the new companies were forced to surrender their plantations.133 The
1914–21 period was one of financial consolidation in rubber for the more successful
companies.134
The Chinese had dominated the tin industry in Malaya, but from 1920, London-
registered companies, with the assistance of new dredging technology, began to
squeeze them out.135 It is likely that the Chinese did not take up dredging themselves
as, unlike the British, they generally did not have the long-term financing required for
the expensive technology.136 In 1920, the proportion of capital invested in British-
registered tin firms was an estimated £3.6 million compared to the equivalent of £1.5
million in locally-registered tin companies.137 In 1926–27, once the price of tin had
risen, there was a scramble for tin shares on the London Stock Exchange. Total capital
increased to £18.7 million in London-based tin companies compared to the much
smaller proportion of the equivalent of £2.2 million invested in locally-registered
companies in Malaya.138
Over time, ownership and control of Malayan rubber and tin companies became
increasingly concentrated. By the end of the 1930s, a large proportion of tin
companies had fallen into the hands of the Howeson group and the tin compa-
nies tended to be connected under agency house management and interlocking
directorships.139 By the 1940s, colonial capitalism in Malaya was an almost
“impenetrable mass of cross holdings”140 which not only linked the rubber and
tin companies, but also bound together several of the agency houses. The big
five agency houses (Boustead-Buttery, Guthries, Harrisons and Crosfield, REA-
Cumberbatch and Sime Darby) also controlled more than 60 per cent of rubber
estates in Malaya that were owned by Europeans. It is estimated that British firms
owned 75 per cent of Malaya’s rubber plantations.141 The Dunlop group, being
directly managed, was the only major British rubber enterprise which did not fit this
pattern of agency house management.142 No more than two dozen directors in Lon-
don, often agency house executives, sat on the boards of nearly two hundred rubber
companies. Through these interlocking directorships and shareholdings, companies
with vast estate and mining assets were actually controlled with little capital.143
Interestingly, the use of agency house management for enterprises in Malaya never
attracted the same kind of criticism or amendments to the company law as eventu-
ally occurred in India, where shareholders protested agents’ siphoning off of huge
profits.144
133 James C. Jackson, Planters and Speculators: Chinese and European Agricultural Enterprise in Malaya,
1786-1921 (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1968) at 246-248.
134 Jomo, A Question of Class, supra note 116 at 183, 184.
135 White, supra note 125 at 27.
136 Van Helten & Jones, supra note 18 at 165, 166.
137 Ibid. at 166.
138 Ibid. at 168.
139 Ibid.
140 White, supra note 125 at 30.
141 Ibid. at 24.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.; Jomo, A Question of Class, supra note 116 at 184.
144 Rungta, supra note 7 at 214, 215; McQueen, A Social History of Company Law, supra note 7 at 395.
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Following World War II, Singapore lost much of its earlier entrepôt trade while
tin and rubber production in Malay recovered slowly. Some substitution for this was
found though manufacturing development with a substantial number of new factories
built by British, Australian, American and Chinese interests.145 While some of this
post-war industrial development was initiated locally, and thus probably accounts
for the increase in new company registrations (see Table 2 for data on 1948–1952),
most of it was attributable to companies headquartered in Europe and America.146
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 raised tin and rubber prices and helped the
Singaporean and Malayan economies to recover. At Independence in 1957, Malaysia
inherited an economy still largely shaped by colonial business interests in tin and
rubber.
The two other significant population groups in Malaya, the Indians and Malays,
were generally not involved in corporate activity during the colonial era. The major-
ity of the Indians in Malaya (about 80 per cent) were imported as unskilled labour for
British coffee and rubber plantations. Indians were preferred as labourers because
it was considered that the Malays did not provide the required labour force and the
Chinese were thought to be insufficiently docile and more difficult to recruit.147
The Indian labourers tended to send their wages home as remittances and during
downturns in the economy returned home to India. It was only in the 1930s that
locally settled Indians began to play a major part in reproducing the labour force.148
The remaining proportion of the Indian population in Malaya consisted of petty
entrepreneurs, businessmen, moneylenders, clerks, policemen and small numbers
of doctors, lawyers and teachers.149 Merchants and financiers were a tiny minor-
ity.150 There was little economic opportunity or governmental encouragement of
large-scale entry of Indian big business into colonial Malaya.151 Larger Indian busi-
nesses tended to be based on family capital, for example, Chettiar Tamil152 firms
would send a family member or agent to Malaya with a certain amount of home
capital to set up a business and was paid a salary and bonus share in profits.153 There
were some Indian privately-owned rubber estates but these were generally small and
greatly outnumbered by the British and Chinese estates.154 The Indian population
in Malaya during the colonial period, in other words, had little involvement with
limited liability companies.
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There is some evidence of pre-colonial use of companies or their local equivalents
in maritime SoutheastAsia.155 However, although traditional Malay rulers were able
to accumulate wealth through taxes and surplus extraction, and probably made small
investments in trading opportunities, they never became commercial capitalists.156
Then, with the extension of British power in Malaya, the ruling class was integrated
into the colonial administration and with comfortable salaries they did not feel the
need to become entrepreneurs.157 The majority of the Malay population were sub-
sistence farmers. The British tended to view the indigenous Malays as indolent and
inefficient—a prejudice that formed part of the “mental furniture” of colonial offi-
cials in Malaya.158 The British took the paternalistic view that Malays were best
kept to the food production sector particularly rice farming, and, through various
policies, tried to prevent Malay peasants turning to rubber cultivation or other kinds
of commercial speculation.159 Nonetheless, Malays did engage in rubber smallhold-
ing (areas under 100 acres) and gained a significant share of the industry, but these
were not corporate concerns.160 From the early 1920s, the British also promoted the
use of cooperatives among government servants, Indian estate labourers and rural
Malays, but generally without any great success.161
In summary, the use of the limited liability company form eventually became
widespread in Malaya for certain population groups particularly for the tin and rubber
industries, but its use was largely disconnected from the legal developments described
in Part III above. There can be no doubt that the limited liability company form
assisted British capital to move globally and to exploit resources and opportunities in
the colonies. We argue, however, that if there had been no local company legislation
in the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States at all it probably would not
have made a significant difference to the history of capitalist development there given
the predominance of London-registered companies and agency houses. Absence of
the legislation would have only inhibited the comparatively small amount of local
capital-raising by resident British and some Chinese entrepreneurs. The existence,
and toleration, of alternative viable forms of business organisation, particularly the
Chinese kongsi and hun systems, also appears to have lessened the impact of the
limited liability company legislation.
V. Conclusions
This paper has presented a detailed account of the development of company law in
the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States. It also presented a description of
the parallel, but largely unconnected, history of the actual use of the limited liability
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company form in these two jurisdictions. This material has allowed us to address the
three debates referred to in the Introduction. First, with regards to the question of
whether the pattern of company law evolution is more a product of legal family or the
“transplant effect”, we found very low levels of adaptability which in turn provides
strong evidence for the “transplant effect”. The pattern of company law evolution in
Malaya was one of fairly regular, if slow, updates that generally mimicked those of
England, but which had only rare instances of interconnection with local economic
developments or with local use of the law. Company law in the Straits Settlements
and Federated Malay States certainly had “common law” characteristics and style
in terms of the content of specific rules. However, despite its common law origins,
the Registrar had a weak regulatory role, there was no local stock exchange and
there was little to no judge-made law. Given all these factors, the actual number
of statutory changes during the colonial era was not an indicator of adaptability.
Although there is evidence for the “transplant effect”, it should be noted that Malaya
did not display the exact pattern of either erratic change or legal stagnation predicted
by Pistor et al. and found in Mahy’s study of Indonesia.
Secondly, with regards to the literature on the nature of the transplant process, the
pattern of transplants in Malaya was quite straightforward and very depoliticised.
Changes were almost always a matter only for technical law-makers. Certainly
there were no mixed transplants, and the assumption that the dispersal of companies
legislation to British colonies always followed the pattern of “Home”, actually holds
largely true in the case of the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay, although the
spread of law from one colony to another rather than always directly from England
is an unexpected finding that should be given more attention in discussions of the
development of company law.
Finally, we conclude that local company law in Malaya certainly served the inter-
ests of British capital, but the law was not explicitly discussed in such terms, and
it was not a particularly successful tool of “imperialism” given the relatively small
number of local incorporations. The dominance of London-registered companies in
Malaya was far more significant. Certainly there was no real attempt made to adapt
the law to facilitate use by the local population.
